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Abstract
Over the past 30 years multinational firms’ investment grew four times faster than
worldwide GDP. Yet the evidence on whether global diversification is valuable is in-
conclusive. This paper uses detailed FDI data for 251 UK multinational firms and
4,676 subsidiaries for the period 1999-2005 to show that multinational firms exhibit,
on average, a global diversification premium. I investigate this result and show that the
premium is positively related to “winner-picking” transfers in internal capital markets,
and more so for better-governed firms. The findings help explain why multinational
firms’ investment and global diversification have significantly increased over the past
three decades.
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1. Introduction
The past 30 years has seen an enormous growth of activity in global diversifica-
tion by multinational firms. Inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have grown
much faster than either trade or income. While worldwide real GDP increased at a rate
of 3.2% a year between 1980-2007 and worldwide exports by 7.3%, worldwide real
inflows of FDI increased by nearly 14%.1 Over the same time period industrial diver-
sification has fallen out of favor. Many of the large conglomerates that were formed in
the 1960s and 1970s were dismantled or became focused in light of a generally nega-
tive view in the 1980s and 1990s. Further, existing evidence such as Denis et al. (2002)
suggests that global diversification is associated with a diversification discount similar
to that for industrially diversified conglomerates.2 Why then has global diversification
continued to prosper?
This paper reconsiders if multinational firms trade at a discount/premium, and if so,
why? In particular I examine if the agency costs that have been found to contribute to the
industrial diversification discount also play a role in multinational firms. Specifically, I
ask if global diversification is valuable; whether the global diversification premium is
associated with with corporate governance; and if multinational firms that create value
engage in “winner-picking” (Stein (1997)) by allocating capital efficiently in internal
capital markets. To answer these questions, I use comprehensive FDI data on multi-
national firms’ subsidiaries and investment. These data provide far richer details about
foreign operations of multinational firms than data used in other studies, and therefore
can be used to generate precise measures of the extent to which firms are globally di-
versified, investment in internal capital markets of multinational firms, and the value of
global diversification.
Recent work on the value of global diversification presents mixed results. Denis
et al. (2002) study US multinational firms using Compustat data and find that global
diversification discounts are of the same order of magnitude as industrial diversifica-
1United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics.
2Morck et al. (1990), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), John and Ofek (1995), Servaes
(1996), Denis et al. (1997), Lins and Servaes (1999), Rajan et al. (2000), and Schoar (2002) plus others
provide evidence of the industrial diversification discount.
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tion discounts. While other studies such as Bodnar et al. (2005), Dastidar (2009), and
Gande et al. (2009) challenge this result, both Click and Harrison (2000) and Christophe
and Pfeiffer (2002) find that global diversification attracts a discount. Examining both
industrial and geographical diversification, Dos Santos et al. (2008) examine US - ac-
quirer cross-border acquisitions and find that related international diversification attracts
a premium, while industrially diversifying cross-border acquisitions attract a discount.
However, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) find that international acquisitions trade
at a discount relative to domestic acquisitions during the period of 1985-1995. In a
related study, Doukas and Lang (2003) present evidence that core-related foreign direct
investment in new plants increases shareholder value.
In contrast, there is an extensive literature in both economics and finance docu-
menting the advantages multinational firms have over domestic firms. In a series of
papers utilizing US foreign direct investment data to study the internal capital markets
of multinational firms, Desai et al. (2004a), Desai et al. (2004b), Desai et al. (2005),
Desai et al. (2007), and Desai et al. (2008b) show that multinational firms optimally
change the capital structure of both the parent company and foreign subsidiaries in re-
sponse to tax, local risk, financial development, and costly external financing, and that
multinational firms use internal capital markets to attenuate the effects of local capital
controls through decreasing subsidiary profitability. Using a similar dataset, Desai et al.
(2008a) show that multinational firms use their internal capital market to take advan-
tage of local currency crises by investing in local assets and capturing sales growth, and
Antras et al. (2009) show that multinational firms’ internal capital markets are advanta-
geous when external capital markets are imperfect. Studies of firm-level FDI data for
the UK, the US, and Italy show that average labor productivity in foreign subsidiaries
of multinational firms is between 30% and 70% higher than for domestic firms, while
for the home activities of multinational firms it is approximately 30% higher (Griffith
(1999), Griffith and Simpson (2004), Griffith et al. (2004), Benfratello and Sembenelli
(2006), and Barba Navaretti and Castellini (2004)).3
3Higher productivity and higher valuations may arise because multinational firms have valuable in-
tangible assets that are most efficiently exported within the firm through the internal capital market. This
idea is central to most of the modern theories of multinationals, starting with Hymer (1976) and sum-
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The lack of a consensus on whether global diversification is valuable is concerning,
given both the results on subsidiary performance and the prevalence of multinational
firms, and reinforces the need for further examination of the issue. Empirically, studies
on the value of global diversification are constrained by data limitations. Accounting
standards often request that firms report business and geographic segments, but firms
have a great deal of discretion in reporting geographic segment data, and these data
are not reported in a complete or consistent manner across firms. Consequently, both
the number and the geographic content of the segments in Compustat and similar data
providers offer little meaningful information. As a result, most prior studies have mea-
sured the value of global diversification relative to focused firms in the country of the
parent, and analysis has been limited to using a dummy variable to measure global
diversification. This study overcomes these data limitations by employing subsidiary
data of UK multinational firms to examine geographic diversification. The UK Office
for National Statistics (ONS) Annual Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI) survey cap-
tures income and balance sheet information on each foreign affiliate and the domestic
operations of all UK based multinational firms. The detail of the AFDI data allows for
estimations of subsidiary-year asset weights for each multinational firm, which in turn
permits comparisons of multinational firms with portfolios of country-industry matched
focused firms. The AFDI data employed in this study features 251 FSTE 500 firms
with foreign direct investment in 4,676 subsidiaries spanning 202 countries from 1999
to 2005.
This paper first examines whether multinational firms trade at a global diversifica-
tion premium or discount relative to comparable focused firms. The results show that
UK multinational firms trade at an average (median) premium of approximately 19%
(10%) when compared with a portfolio of country-industry matched focused firms. Fur-
ther, the value premium is increasing in the span of global diversification, measured
simply as the number of countries in which a multinational firm has subsidiaries with
a controlling interest. The result is robust to using alternate measures of diversifica-
marized in Caves (1996) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2005). Morck and Yeung (1991) present
evidence consistent with these theories.
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tion, and including country-level stock market price ratios, economic development, and
UK-foreign country relations.
Second, the paper investigates if differences in firm-level corporate governance are
value relevant.4 Aggarwal et al. (2009) show that firms with higher levels of firm-level
governance and countries where firm-level governance mechanisms are more prevalent
are associated with higher market valuations. I examine both the level of governance of
the UK parent and the difference in governance between the UK parent and a portfolio
of focused firms matched on country and industry. Both are positively associated with
the global diversification premium. The results show that approximately one-quarter of
the variation in value premium can be explained by differences in firm-level governance
between the multinational firm and foreign firms similar to its subsidiaries. The result
is based on differences in firm-level governance for developed countries only, where
governance is strongest, and likely underestimates the true importance of firm-level
governance.
Next, I examine whether internal capital markets contribute to the global diversi-
fication value premium. The question of how efficiently diversified firms use internal
capital markets is central to the debate on diversification and value. One way in which
diversified firms can finance investments - that is not an option for focused firms - is
through cash flow transfers from divisions without investments to divisions with in-
vestments. At the same time, the literature on internal capital markets for industrially
diversified firms has shown that one potential cost to being diversified is mismanage-
ment of internal cash flows, which are not always allocated to high-growth divisions
(see for example, Shin and Stulz (1998), Rajan et al. (2000)). For each multinational
firm I classify its subsidiaries as high-productivity or low-productivity based on invest-
ment opportunities. Using the ONS AFDI data I estimate the value-added created by
each multinational firm through cross-divisional transfers in the internal capital market,
similar to Rajan et al. (2000). If, on average, high-productivity subsidiaries receive an
4Firm-level or internal corporate governance captures the governance mechanisms that operate within
the firm, and are heavily influenced by a firm’s choice of governance attributes in its charter and policies.
These govern decision-making at both the parent and subsidiary level and may provide an explanation of
why multinational firms’ subsidiaries exhibit better financial decision-making and higher productivity.
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increase in investment and low-productivity subsidiaries receive lower investment, then
the internal capital market will contribute to the value of the multinational firm, and
in turn the global diversification premium. Consistent with this, I find that the global
diversification premium is positively related to the value added from transfers across
divisions. Furthermore, the results show that the relation between the diversification
premium and transfers across divisions is stronger in well-governed firms. Better gov-
erned multinational firms create more value through efficient transfers in their global
internal capital market.
The results on corporate governance and internal capital market allocation demon-
strate the channels through which global diversification is valuable. There are relatively
few studies that examine the linkage between quality of corporate governance and the
global diversification discount/premium, and none that examine internal capital markets
and the global diversification discount/premium. Gande et al. (2009) show that global
diversification is more valuable where US firms diversify into countries with creditor
rights that are stronger than that of the US. A few papers examine the industrial diver-
sification discount internationally. Khanna and Palepu (2000) argue that diversification
may be more valuable in emerging markets than in more developed economies. Fau-
ver et al. (2003) examine firms from 35 countries during 1991-1995 and find that the
value of corporate diversification is related to the level of capital market development,
international integration, and legal systems.
Combined with the literature on productivity and capital allocation for subsidiaries
of multinational firms, the findings in this paper may help explain why multinational
firms’ investment and global diversification have significantly increased over the past
two decades. If multinational firms do not provide shareholders with superior invest-
ment opportunities then they should demise in the manner that industrially diversified
conglomerates have fallen out of favor. Instead, both the UK ONS and US Bureau of
Economic Analysis show that FDI has grown significantly. In addition to the growth
in global inward FDI of 14% between 1980-2007, I find that the percentage of foreign
assets in UK multinational firms increased from 49% to 68% through 1999 to 2005,
and Denis et al. (2002) document that the percentage of US public firms that are multi-
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national increased from 23% to 45% through 1984 to 1997. If global diversification is
valuable, these trends are easily explained by shareholders and firms allocating capital
to superior investments.
In extensions to the main results, I show that the value of global diversification is
associated with the distance between the parent firm and subsidiaries, culture, and open-
ness to trade. The global diversification premium is greater where geographical distance
between the multinational parent and it subsidiaries is lower; where subsidiaries are lo-
cated in countries with similar culture to that of the parent home country; and where
FDI is in countries most open to trade. The results show that the efficacy of FDI de-
pends not only on the multinational firm but also country-level similarities. Further,
the documented global diversification discount is robust to these characteristics. Next, I
examine alternate measures of diversification. Alternate measures of diversification, in-
cluding industrial diversification, are shown to be weakly value-relevant but the global
diversification premium continues to be significant. Finally, I employ instrumental vari-
able analysis and Heckman’s two-step procedure to show that the results are robust to
controlling for simultaneity and self-selection biases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data in detail.
Section 3 presents the results on the global diversification premium, linkages to multi-
national firm corporate governance, and internal capital markets. Section 4 investigates
the robustness of results by considering alternative specifications and endogeneity. Fi-
nally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
Multinational firms and their subsidiaries are identified using the Annual Foreign
Direct Investment Survey, a proprietary dataset from the UK ONS.5 The ONS collects
5The purpose of the survey is to collect financial information on the relationship between UK com-
panies and foreign parents and associates (inward FDI), and between UK companies and foreign sub-
sidiaries, affiliates, and branches (outward FDI). The information is primarily required for measuring
the UK’s balance of payments and international investment position. The survey comprises three main
areas: flows of investment, level or stock of investment, and earnings from the investment in the local
enterprise. The level or stock of investment represents the net book value of the subsidiary to the parent
at the end of the period. This accounts for goodwill write-offs, the revaluation of assets, and exchange
rate fluctuations.
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and prepares foreign direct investment (FDI) flow and stock data and local subsidiary
operating data.6 For each subsidiary the GBP net book value is reported at the two-digit
level of the UK Standard Industrial Classification and across 214 countries. In 2005 the
data covered 2,307 UK multinational firms and 10,580 subsidiaries in 2005.
The sample is focused in two ways: first, only those firms that are constituents of the
FTSE 500 are included. Next, as is standard in the corporate finance literature, financial,
real estate, and insurance firms, as well as firms operating in government or education
are excluded. However, for non-financial multinational firms, only those that report a
financial subsidiary with an asset weight greater than 20% are excluded.7 Lastly, firm
characteristics are collected from Worldscope for the final sample of 251 multinational
firms
The analysis in this paper compares the value of multinational firms with the im-
puted value of its subsidiaries based on benchmark comparable firms. The benchmark
is a comparable firm matched on the country and industry of each subsidiary. To fa-
cilitate this, country-industry median values for Tobin’s q and firm characteristics are
are captured from Worldscope for 63 countries and 18 Industry Classification Bench-
mark (ICB) super-sector industries.8 The universe of comparable firms is then reduced
as follows. First, only industrially focused firms are included. Second, similar to the
industrial diversification literature, all local firms with a Tobin’s q greater than eight are
excluded. Third, any local industry match with less than five observations are dropped.
Since the Annual Foreign Direct Investment Survey covers investment in up to 214
countries and Worldscope collects public firm data for 63 countries some subsidiaries
have no comparable firm at the local level. The fraction of subsidiaries matched at the
country-industry level is 67% on an asset-weighted basis. For empty local matches, a
6The local enterprise units include subsidiaries, associate companies, and branches. If a firm owns
more than 50% of the equity share capital of another firm, then that is its subsidiary. If only 10% to 50%
is owned, then it is an associate. A branch is a permanent plant as defined for UK corporation tax and
double taxation relief purposes. Throughout this study, subsidiary refers simply to any enterprise unit
where the multinational firm has effective voice (>10% ownership).
7Further investigation shows that many of the financial subsidiaries of non-financial firms are treasury
functions required by larger multinational firms. For robustness, the analysis is repeated for lower cut-
offs, and consequently lower sample sizes, with similar results.
8Worldscope includes data on over 38,000 firms globally. The ICB industrial sectors are from World-
scope and are consistent across countries.
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benchmark is selected at the region-industry level. Twelve regions are identified based
on financial development, GDP, and locality.9 For null regional matches the benchmark
is the UK-industry match. Therefore the match of last resort compares subsidiaries of
UK multinational firms with UK focused firms. Overall, 67% of the match is at the
local level, 32% at the regional level, and only 1% rely on a UK match.10 Fourth,
observations where the imputed level of Tobin’s q is greater than eight, or where the
actual value is either greater than four times or less than one-fourth its imputed value
are dropped.11
The resulting sample includes 251 public multinational firms from the FTSE 500.
These firms have interests in 4,676 subsidiaries (4,431 are outside of the UK) operating
in 202 countries with a median book value of £6.1 million (£4.7 million outside of the
U.K). Table 1 presents the multinational firm investment and operations. The sample
comprises 1,166 firm-years and 21,315 subsidiary-years. On average, 54.5% of all
assets are held in foreign subsidiaries. Of these, approximately one-third sits in the US
and a further one-third in Europe. Investment in foreign subsidiaries has grown from
49.2% to 67.7% from 1999 through to 2005, while investment in US subsidiaries has
decreased from 17.9% to 12.8%. The smallest individual recipients are mostly Asian
countries such as Taiwan and the Philippines, or Eastern European countries such as
Turkey and the Czech Republic. On the whole, only a very small percentage of assets
sit in the least-developed regions: 0.48% sit in Central Africa, 0.56% sit in the Middle-
East, and 1.91% sit in Central America and the Caribbean. On average, multinational
firms span 12.2 countries and 2.5 countries through 18.3 subsidiaries.
9The twelve regions are Central America and Caribbean, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Japan, Middle
East and North Africa, Oceania, Scandinavia, South America, South East Asia, UK, US and Canada,
Western Europe excluding the UK and Scandinavia. Subsidiaries in Africa are replicated using the UK
comparable firms because of limited coverage in Worldscope.
10An examination of omitted robustness regressions focusing solely on those firms with a local match
does not reveal significantly different results, but does yield lower statistical power.
11This strategy is also used in Berger and Ofek (1995) and Denis et al. (2002)
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3. Main Results
3.1. The global diversification premium
I measure the global diversification premium using a variation of the excess value
measure originally developed by Lang and Stulz (1994). Excess value is computed
as the difference between the market value of a multinational firm and a portfolio of
single-segment firms in the same country, same industry, and same year. This approach
assumes that the best match for a multinational subsidiary is a firm in the subsidiary’s
country of operation, and not in the multinational parent’s home country. 12 I com-
pute the log of the ratio of a firm’s Tobin’s q and its imputed Tobin’s q, where the
imputed value is the end-of-the-year asset-weighted average Tobin’s q of comparable
stand-alone firms. Tobin’s q is estimated as the market value of equity plus book value
of total assets minus book value of common equity, all depleted by the replacement
value of assets, which is estimated as the book value of total assets. The asset weight
in each subsidiary-country-industry-year is calculated using the book value of assets
(measured in nominal GBP) from the UK ONS AFDI survey. The method for selecting
stand-alone firms is described in Section 2.
Table 2 presents univariate results for the global diversification premium. Panel A
presents a first glance into the differences between multinational firms and local firms.
In addition, I estimate relative measures of possible determinants of excess value us-
ing the same method as for Tobin’s q. The independent firm characteristics generally
used in the literature are firm size measured by the natural logarithm of total sales
(Log(Sales)), and the ratios of total debt to assets (Debt/Assets), capital expenditures to
assets (Capex/Assets), earnings before interest and taxes to sales (Ebit/Sales), and re-
search and development expense to sales (R&D/Sales). Similar to prior work these vari-
ables are winsorized at extreme percentiles (1st and 99th). The average (median) raw
excess value is 10% (6%). Significantly, multinational firms are larger, invest more, and
12This is akin to assuming global segmentation in the market for real assets. In contrast, Denis et al.
(2002) match at the home country. Where real assets do differ across countries, matching at the sub-
sidiary’s country of operation allows insight into the effects of multinational firm ownership and global
diversification. Alternatively, matching at the multinational firm’s home country may lead to spurious re-
sults where valuation results are driven by differences in the valuation of similar assets across countries.
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produce higher profits than their benchmark portfolio of comparable local firms. Panel
B presents descriptive statistics on global and industrial diversification. The degree of
global diversification, Global Div, is measured as the number of countries in which a
multinational firm has subsidiaries. Global diversification is highly correlated with the
number of subsidiaries (coefficient of 0.86) and less so with industrial diversification
measured as the number of ICB industries (coefficient of 0.34).
In Panel C a broad brush analysis of excess value and diversification is presented.
Excess value is increasing in the degree of global diversification. On average, multi-
national firms that invest in less than three countries exhibit no significant excess value
while the most globally diversified firms exhibit an excess value of 24.5%. Further, the
least globally diversified multinational firms tend to trade at a zero premium or discount.
Combined, these univariate results show that multinational firms are more highly valued
than their benchmark portfolio of comparable local firms. However, plausible explana-
tions for the difference in value might be that multinational firms have characteristics
that make them more valuable; indeed Panel A of Table 2 shows that multinational firms
are significantly different to their imputed firms. Equally, the univariate results suggest
an industrial diversification premium. It is therefore necessary to examine the relation-
ship between valuation and global diversification in multivariate regressions that control
for firm characteristics.
Table 3 reports the results from regressing multinational firms’ excess values on
global diversification, firm characteristics and calendar-year dummies, where standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. Regressions (1) – (3) show estimates
for regressions of excess value on a constant and the degree of global diversification
(Global Div). The results show that, after controlling for time effects, multinational
firms are valued at a premium compared with their local counterparts. Regression (3)
presents results of estimation of excess value on Global Div and Global Div2. The ex-
cess value-diversity relationship is curvilinear: the value premium increases at lower
levels of global diversity and then decreases for higher levels.13 Regression (4) intro-
13The optimum number of countries is between forty and fifty. While this number should not be taken
literally it does suggest that more internationally diversified multinational firms are valued more highly.
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duces firm characteristics generally used in the literature. For each firm, the relative
difference between its own and imputed characteristic is used. The relative differences
are firm size measured by the natural logarithm of total sales (Log(Sales)), and the ra-
tios of total debt to assets (Debt/Assets), capital expenditures to assets (Capex/Assets),
earnings before interest and taxes to sales (Ebit/Sales), and research and development
expense to sales (R&D/Sales). Consistent with existing literature, excess value is higher
for firms with higher Ebit to sales, investment in R&D, and capital expenditure.
Regressions (5) and (6) re-introduce global diversification. For a multinational firm
with subsidiaries in the average of 12.2 countries the value premium is estimated to be
nineteen percentage points after controlling for differences in firm characteristics com-
pared with twenty percentage points in regression (3). These results indicate that global
diversification is valuable. Further, the presence of a global diversification premium
may explain why, unlike industrial diversification, global diversification has continued
to increase
3.2. Does better governance explain the premium?
In this section I examine the relation between firm-level corporate governance and
the global diversification value premium. A significant literature shows that corpo-
rate governance is an important determinant for firm value. In the modern era this
begins with Jensen and Meckling (1976), Morck et al. (1990) and others in the US,
and La Porta et al. (1998), La Porta et al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2002), Dyck and
Zingales (2004) plus others internationally. More recently, Aggarwal et al. (2009) show
that firm-level corporate governance is important in explaining differences in firm val-
uation across countries. In addition, better firm-level governance may explain why
subsidiaries of multinational firms are valued higher than local comparable firms. For
instance, a subsidiary of a UK multinational firm might benefit from the same level of
governance as the parent firm, which in turn might be higher than foreign firms local to
the subsidiary.
To measure the corporate governance of both the multinational parent and foreign
firms I use the composite governance index from Aggarwal et al. (2011). They build
the composite governance index using 41 firm-level governance attributes collected by
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Risk Metrics/ISS for twenty-three countries. Each firm receives a score of one for every
attribute present, and the aggregate score is divided through by 41. The attributes cover
four broad subcategories: (1) Board (24 attributes), (2) Audit (three attributes), (3)
Anti-takeover provisions (six attributes), and (4) Compensation and ownership (eight
attributes).14 Throughout, I assume that a subsidiary benefits from the same level of
governance as its parent.
I use the composite governance index in two ways to examine if the global diversi-
fication value premium is related to governance. First, I use the composite governance
index for the UK parent, GOV . The parent-level composite governance index mea-
sures the governance for the UK parent only. Consequently, estimations of excess value
including GOV tests if better governed multinational firms exhibit larger global diver-
sification premiums. The average GOV for UK multinational firms is 56%, and the
standard deviation is 7.3%.
Next, I measure the difference between the UK parent’s composite governance in-
dex and its benchmark composite governance index, GOV GAP, where the benchmark
is based on the location and industry of its subsidiaries. The benchmark composite
governance index estimates the level of governance for each subsidiary as if it were
owned locally using the country-industry median composite governance index. For
each parent multinational firm the benchmark is estimated as the asset-weighted aver-
age of its subsidiaries’ benchmark composite governance index. For subsidiaries where
no benchmark composite governance index exists, the benchmark is the country median
composite governance index, else the parent composite governance index is used. For
UK multinational firms the average GOV GAP is -0.1% and insignificant from zero,
and the the standard deviation is 4.7%. The insignificance of GOV GAP shows that
UK multinational firms are, on average, no better governed than the portfolio of bench-
mark firms. Importantly, this rules out that the global diversification value premium
14Board attributes capture the aspects of the board of directors such as board independence, compo-
sition of committees, size, transparency, and how the board conducts its work. Audit includes questions
on the independence of the audit committee and the role of auditors. Anti-takeover provisions are drawn
from the firms charter and by-laws and refer to dual-class structure, role of shareholders, poison pills, and
blank check preferred. Compensation and ownership deals with executive and director compensation on
issues related to options, stock ownership and loans, and how compensation is set and monitored.
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documented in Section 3.1 arises simply because the benchmark firms have worse gov-
ernance on average.
The results from regressions estimating excess value on corporate governance are
presented in Table 4. Once again, I estimate multinational firms’ excess values in a
regression on global diversification, firm characteristics and calendar-year dummies,
where standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. In regressions (1)
and (2) I introduce GOV and GOV GAP as explanatory variables. The results indicate
that firm-level corporate governance is an important determinant of the documented
global diversification premium. The coefficient on GOV of 0.009 in regression (1) is
both economically and statistically significant, and shows that better governed multi-
national firms exhibit higher global diversification premia. A one standard deviation
increase in GOV is associated with an increase in the value premium of around six per-
centage points. Regression (2) examines the effect of the governance gap, GOV GAP,
on the value premium. The coefficient on GOV GAP of 0.012 is both economically
and statistically significant, and shows that the global diversification premium is higher
for multinational firms better governed than benchmark foreign firms. A one standard
deviation increase in GOV GAP is associated with an increase in the value premium of
around five and a half percentage points.
The results in regressions (1) and (2) show that better governed firms are associated
with a greater diversification premium and that the premium is largest where the gov-
ernance gap between subsidiaries of multinational firms and benchmark foreign firms
is largest. This finding suggests that multinational firms that export good governance
through the organization achieve higher valuations. The ability of a multinational par-
ent firm to set governance in foreign subsidiaries should depend on the control rights
that the parent has in the subsidiary. To estimate control rights, I include the ownership
stake that the multinational firm has in the subsidiary. Table 1 shows that on average
multinational firms have 94.5% ownership in their subsidiaries. Further, parent firms
have 100% ownership in 69% of subsidiaries. Regression (3) includes both the asset
weighted ownership OWN, and the asset weighted interaction of GOVGAP and OWN.
The results show that value continues to be positively related to the governance gap,
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but further that the effect is stronger where multinational firms hold a larger ownership
stake in subsidiaries.
Next, I examine if governance is more important for firms that are more globally
diversified. If the costs to diversification arise because internal capital markets increase
the scope for agency costs, then corporate governance should be more important for
the multinational firms most globally diversified. In Regression (4) I introduce the in-
teraction between GOV GAP and Global Div. Once again, both the coefficients on
Global Div and GOV GAP are positive and significant. Further, the coefficient on
Global Div×GOV GAP is positive and significant, which indicates that corporate gov-
ernance is complimentary to global diversification:
The results in regressions (1) – (4) support the hypothesis that multinational firms
are able to create value through corporate governance. However, the value-governance
relationship may flow in both directions. An alternate hypothesis is that local firms
are better governed and have higher valuations than multinational firms’ subsidiaries.
Then, the governance gap would be positively related to valuation, but the regression
results would describe a governance discount. For UK multinational firms this might
arise because a significant proportion of assets are invested in countries with better
firm-level governance such as the US and Canada. If the results in regressions (1) -
(4) reflect only a governance discount then including the governance gap for only those
subsidiaries that have a positive governance gap – and setting it to zero for all other
subsidiaries – should yield insignificant results. This is addressed in regression (5). The
coefficient for the positive governance gap is similar to early results and equates to a
governance premium of approximately seven percentage points.
While the results for the governance effects on the valuation premium are both
economically and statistically significant, they probably underestimate the true signif-
icance. The governance gap employed measures the governance gap for twenty-three
developed countries and ignores governance differences between UK multinationals
and firms in much less well developed countries. In comparison, excess value tracks
comparable firms in sixty-three countries. Thus the results likely underestimate the true
importance of the firm-level governance channel.
15
Overall, the results on corporate governance show that multinational firms are re-
warded, in terms of valuation premium, for both better corporate governance in general
and better corporate governance than foreign firms in the location of subsidiaries. The
findings are consistent with those in Ellis et al. (2012), who present evidence that ac-
quirers from countries with better governance gain more from acquisitions, and that
gains are higher when targets are from countries with worse governance. The results
illustrate that better governance is an important determinant of the global diversification
premium.
3.3. Internal capital markets
In this section I examine whether internal capital markets contribute to the global
diversification value premium. The question of how efficiently diversified firms use
internal capital markets is central to the debate on diversification and value. One way
in which diversified firms can finance investments - that is not an option for focused
firms - is through cash flow transfers from divisions without investments to divisions
with investments. Such transfers in internal capital markets may provide greater bene-
fits to globally diversified firms than for industrially diversified firms operating within
a single country because both investment opportunities and financing vary more across
subsidiaries. At the same time, the literature on internal capital markets for industrially
diversified firms has shown that one potential cost to being diversified is mismanage-
ment of internal cash flows, which are not always allocated to high-growth divisions
(see for example, Shin and Stulz (1998), Rajan et al. (2000)).
To study the relation between global diversification, internal capital markets, and
value, I examine how cross-divisional transfers affect value in the spirit of Rajan et al.
(2000). I first distinguish between efficient and inefficient transfers by classifying sub-
sidiaries into low-productivity and high-productivity divisions based on their investment
opportunities. Specifically, I examine whether the (country-industry) imputed Tobin’s q
for subsidiary j, q j is lower or higher than the firm simple average imputed Tobin’s q, q j.
If the imputed Tobin’s q is higher, the subsidiary is classified as a high-productivity sub-
sidiary. If it is lower, it is classified as a low-productivity subsidiary. The comparison
between the subsidiary investment opportunities, estimated as the imputed Tobin’s q,
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with the average investment opportunity available to the firm facilitates examination of
whether multinational firms make efficient transfers into high-productivity subsidiaries.
Next, I estimate transfers across subsidiaries using the change in asset weight over the
year, ∆ω j,t. The transfer measures the increase or decrease in resources in a subsidiary
relative to all other subsidiaries in the firm. Finally, I compute value added at the firm-
level by first weighting the transfer to a subsidiary by the difference between a sub-
sidiary’s Tobin’s q and the average Tobin’s q in the firm, and then adding the weighted
transfer across all N subsidiaries of a firm in a year:
Value Addedt = ΣNj=1ω j,t∆ω j,t
(
q j,t − q j,t
)
(1)
where ω j,t is the share of firm resources in division j at the beginning of the year, ∆ω j,t
is the change in resources in subsidiary j which is the measure of the funds transferred
to/from a subsidiary (relative to other subsidiaries), and q j,t − q j,t is the difference be-
tween a subsidiary’s Tobin’s q and the average Tobin’s q in the firm. Firm value added
measures the value created through transfers - in terms of investment weights - towards
higher productivity subsidiaries. If, on average, high-productivity subsidiaries with
q j,t > q j,t receive an increase in investment, ∆ω j,t > 0, and low-productivity subsidiaries
with q j,t < q j,t receive lower investment, ∆ω j,t < 0, then the internal capital market
should contribute to the value added of the multinational firm.
There is a subtle difference between the transfers Rajan et al. (2000) use and the
transfers I use to estimate value added in equation 1. Rajan et al. (2000) measure trans-
fers by the difference between the dollar investment a segment makes when it is part of
a diversified firm and the investment it would have made had it been on its own, which
is approximated by the weighted average of the ratio of capital expenditures to assets
of single-segment firms in the same industry. Next, they subtract the average industry-
adjusted capital expenditure-to-assets ratio averaged across the segments of the firm to
control for the possibility that diversified firms have more funds. As it is not possi-
ble to measure dollar investment for each subsidiary, I use the change in investment
weight. The advantage of this approach is that directly captures the relative expansion
or contraction of subsidiaries. The disadvantage is that I am unable to measure trans-
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fers relative to single segment firms, which is relevant for examining the value premium
relative to single country-industry benchmark firms. Therefore, in the analysis of the
efficiency of internal capital markets I examine the value of the multinational firm rather
than excess value.
The descriptive statistics for value added are presented in Table 5. Panel A shows
that value added is on average positive: multinational firms on average transfer invest-
ment towards high-productivity subsidiaries. In Panel B I sort valued added by global
diversification and corporate governance separately, where the sorts are based in the
median year level. Value added is increasing in both global diversification, which re-
flects the size of the internal capital market, and corporate governance, which indicates
how well capital should be allocated within an internal capital market. Next, I sort
by global diversification and corporate governance to examine the combined affect of
diversification and governance on value added. The results show that firms with both
greater diversification and better corporate governance realize the greatest value added.
Further, moving from low diversification to high diversification only increases value
added where corporate governance is high; and moving from low governance to high
governance only matters for value added in those firms that exhibit high levels of diver-
sification. Consistent with the results presented in Table 4, corporate governance and
global diversification are complimentary in creating value. While the prior results fo-
cused on Tobin’s Q, the results on value added show that transfers through the internal
capital market in firms with high corporate governance is one channel through which
the value premium arises.
To understand if the efficient transfers in the internal capital market contribute to
multinational firm value, I estimate the relation between Tobin’s q of a multinational
firm and the value added by allocation. These results are reported in Table 6. I in-
clude the relative firm-level characteristics introduced earlier, and again include calen-
dar year dummies and cluster standard errors at the firm-level. Regression (1) presents
estimation results of multinational firm value on value added (VA) and firm character-
istics. Value added has a positive and significant effect on firm value (coefficient of
0.2839). Multinational firms that allocate investment towards high productivity sub-
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sidiaries exhibit higher valuations. This result indicates that multinational firms add
value by forming an internal capital market where resources can be allocated to their
best use, or “winner-picking” (Stein (1997)).
It is possible that value added is related to either the degree of global diversifica-
tion or corporate governance. In columns (2) and (3) I introduce global diversification
(Global Div) and firm-level corporate governance (GOV). Importantly, value added
continues to have a positive and significant effect on firm value. In fact, the importance
of value added becomes larger and more significant when included alongside GOV ,
which suggests that there may be an interaction effect between value added and gov-
ernance. Indeed, it is plausible that firms with better governance make more efficient
transfers because better governance mitigates agency problems. Hoechle et al. (2011)
find that the industrial diversification discount narrows significantly for firms with bet-
ter corporate governance. To explore this, I include the interaction between governance
and value added, GOV × VA, in the estimation of multinational firm value, and report
the results in column (4). The results show that multinational firm value is increasing
in both value added and corporate governance, and further also increasing where the in-
teraction of value added and governance is greater. While governance and value added
contribute to firm value separately the effects are also complimentary. Better governed
multinational firms create more value through efficient transfers in their global internal
capital market.
4. Extensions and robustness
4.1. Distance, culture, and openness
In this section I investigate the relation between a multinational firm’s global diver-
sification premium and characteristics of the host countries in which it invests. The
characteristics considered are distance; culture and religion; and openness to trade.
These three groups of characteristics potentially explain country pairwise differences
in global diversification not captured by firms relative financial characteristics
Distance is taken from the CEPII Distances dataset, and measures the bilateral dis-
tance between the UK and host country in terms of geographical distance. Gravity
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models have been used to explain trade and FDI since Tinbergen (1962), and imply
that geographical distance might pose barriers to FDI. The second group of character-
istics are culture and religion. Religion and other cultural dimensions have been shown
to affect economic outcomes (Barro and McCleary (2003); Guiso et al. (2003); Guiso
et al. (2006)). Further, Stulz and Williamson (2003) show that culture, proxied by dif-
ferences in religion and language, can explain creditor and investor rights; Mueller and
Philipon (2011) show that culture and religion affect corporate ownership; and Ahern
et al. (2012) show that culture affects merger activity and outcomes. Following Stulz
and Williamson, I measure religion distance using the primary religion of the country
using the CIA World Factbook. To proxy for cultural distance from the UK I include a
dummy variable indicating if the host country shares a common language and is/was a
British colony. Both measures are from the CEPII Distances dataset.
Openness measures how open a country is to international trade. One might expect
that multinational firms fare better in countries open to international trade, possibly
because incumbents are open to foreign ownership or openness spurs financial develop-
ment (Rajan et al. (2000)). I use two measures of international trade. Natural Openness
(FR) from Frankel and Romer (1999) is a measure of natural openness based only on
geographic characteristics and uses a gravity model that presumes that countries closer
to each other trade more with each other. Natural Openness (WEI) from Wei (2000) is
based on country size, geography and linguistics. The benefit of using natural openness
and openness measured by trade is that trade potentially includes trade policies.
I test if these characteristics are important for multinational firm excess value by
repeating the tests presented in Table 3 for one characteristic at a time.15 For each coun-
try characteristic, I compute the firm weighted average measure using the subsidiary
asset weights as previously described. For example, multinational firm distance is the
asset weighted bilateral distance between the UK and its overseas divisions. The re-
sults are presented in Table 7. The coefficients on GlobalDiv, GlobalDiv2, and the
characteristic of interest (Z) only are shown in the sake of brevity. First, I examine
15The country characteristics tend to be highly correlated, so that multicollinearity may make it difficult
to assess the separate effects in regressions with multiple independent variables.
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geographical distance by including the natural logarithm of the asset weighted bilateral
distance, measured in thousands of kilometers. The coefficient of -0.014 in regression
(1) is statistically significant and indicates that the global diversification premium is
negatively related to the average geographical distance between the UK parent and its
subsidiaries. This result may follow because distance dampens multinational produc-
tivity (Barba Navaretti and Venables (2005)) and/or geographical distance may provide
a barrier to monitoring of foreign divisions.
Next, I examine if the UK and host country have a common language or religion,
and if the host country is a former British colony. The three characteristics are dummy
variables equal to one if the host country has a common language with the UK (English),
a common primary religion (Protestant), or is/was a British colony respectively. The
results are presented in the columns (2) – (4) of Table 7. The global diversification
premium is greater for multinational firms that have a greater proportion of foreign
direct investment in host countries sharing the same primary language, same primary
religion or are/were British colonies. Lastly, in columns (5) and (6) I report the results of
estimations examining openness. The coefficients of both the Frankel and Romer and
Wei measures of natural openness to trade are positive and significant, which reveals
that the global diversification premium is larger where the host country is open to trade.
Overall, the findings on linkages between the global diversification value and dis-
tance, culture, and openness show that non-financial country-level characteristics play




The measure of global diversification employed in the preceding results is the num-
ber of countries in which a multinational firm invests. It is possible that the diversifi-
cation premium is associated with only this measure of diversification, or that an alter-
native measure of diversification adds better insight to the findings. Table 8 presents
regression results using alternative measures of diversification. First, in regressions (1)
and (2) the foreign asset weight and country weight Hirschman-Herfindahl (Country HHI)
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Index are employed as measures of global diversification. In both estimations, the co-
efficient on the alternate measure of global diversification is significant and implies a
global diversification premium. However, the results in column (3) shows that number
of countries in which a multinational firm invests better estimates the value premium
Columns (4) – (7) of Table 8 present robustness results for different types of di-
versification. In columns (4) and (5) the number of industries in which a firm invests
(Ind Div) is employed as the measure of industrial diversification. The coefficients on
Ind Div suggest an industrial diversification discount but the effect is insignificant. In
column (5) the coefficient on global diversification continues to be significant. Results
in column (6) show that organizational diversification, measured by subsidiary count, is
significant in explaining value. However, given the high correlation between the number
of subsidiaries and countries shown in Table 2 it is not surprising that subsidiary count
ceases to be significant when combined with Global Div in column (7). Combined,
these results confirm that the value premium is robust to the choice of measurement of
diversification, and that the number of countries in which a multinational firm invests is
not a proxy for alternative forms of diversification.
4.3. Endogeneity
Since multinational firms choose to diversify internationally, the same firm-level
characteristics that guide this decision may also affect the market’s valuation of the
firm. As explored in the industrial diversification literature by Campa and Kedia (2002),
Chevalier (2004), Graham et al. (2002), Lamont and Polk (2001), Maksimovic and
Phillips (2002), Villalonga (2004a), Villalonga (2004b), Whited (2001) and others, fail-
ure to control for firm traits that drive the diversification decision may produce mislead-
ing econometric results that inappropriately attribute the premium to global diversifica-
tion per se rather than to the underlying traits that induce firms to diversify overseas.
To control for multinational firm-specific traits and endogeneity concerns, two steps
are taken. First, three instrumental variable specifications are used. The first instru-
mental variable specification uses industry effects. Industry factors may jointly explain
global diversification and the global diversification premium because different produc-
tion technologies and intellectual capital offer varying opportunities for global diversi-
22
fication. If differences in firm characteristics do not fully capture the industry effects,
then the premium may arise because UK firms in specific industries are both more valu-
able than their foreign comparable firms, and are more likely to diversify globally. The
second instrumental variable specification additionally examines if multinational firm
characteristics, and not differences from their imputed measures, affect diversification
choice and valuation. For example, larger firms may be more likely to diversify overseas
because they have created value in the UK. The third specification uses a tobit instru-
mental variable estimation to account for the left censoring in global diversification.
This reflects that certain industries and firm characteristics may be unsuitable for global
diversification. All instrumental variable results use two-stage least squares estimations,
where the first stage regression estimates the degree of global diversification using the
instruments. All two-stage least squares regressions include calendar-year effects, stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm-level, and only the linear effect of diversification on
value is included.
In all three specifications, the regression results continue to indicate a diversifica-
tion premium for multinational firms. The first set of results that uses industry effects as
instruments is presented in column (1) of Table 9. The coefficient of global diversifica-
tion on excess value remains positive and significant. Unreported first stage regression
results show that industry effects are important for global diversification choice. Specif-
ically, energy and telecommunications firms are likely to most diversified while con-
struction and electricity exhibit a negative association with diversification. The second
specification additionally uses multinational firm level characteristics as instruments in
the first stage.16 Regression (2) reports the results and confirms the finding of a global
diversification premium. Finally the tobit instrumental variable regression results that
use both industry and firm characteristics are presented in regression (3). As before
the results support the evidence that global diversification is associated with a value
premium.
The second step in controlling for endogeneity is to use Heckman’s two-step proce-
16In the first stage regressions firm size and investment in R&D are the most important determinants
of global diversification.
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dure. The goal is to control for the self-selection bias due to firms’ choosing to diversify
internationally by incorporating the diversification decision formally into the economet-
ric estimation. To employ Heckman’s procedure the UK multinational firms are com-
bined with the remaining FTSE 500 firms that are focused domestically. This results in
a sample of 2,365 firm-years, of which 1,166 are internationally diversified. The first
step estimates whether a firm is diversified internationally. This involves a probit esti-
mation with a dependent dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a multinational firm
and zero otherwise, where explanatory variables are the instrumental variables used in
regressions (3) and (4). The second stage treats excess value as the dependent variable
and yields estimates for the relationship between diversity and excess value and the
self-selection model (Lambda).
Regression (4) of Table 9 presents the results. The results of the two-stage estima-
tion of the endogenous self-selection model confirm the existence of a global diversi-
fication premium. In the excess value equation, global diversification enters positively
and significantly, but is slightly lower compared with earlier results. The selection pa-
rameter, Lambda, is positive but insignificant. This suggests that firms with higher
excess valuations are more likely to diversify but the effect is insignificant.
In summary, unlike for the findings on industrial diversification, simultaneity bias
does not explain the global diversification premium. Further, the global diversification
premium is robust to controlling for self-selection.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I use detailed FDI data to shed new light on the nature of global di-
versification by multinational firms. Using a unique sample of 251 UK multinational
firms and 4,676 subsidiaries, the paper first shows that multinational firms exhibit, on
average, a global diversification premium compared with a country-industry matched
portfolio of focused firms. Second, I examine channels through which multinational
firms can add value and show that the value premium is higher where the difference be-
tween the UK and subsidiary host country’s firm-level corporate governance is highest;
multinational firms are compensated for good corporate governance.
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Next, I examine whether internal capital markets contribute to the global diversifi-
cation value premium. Stein (1997) argues that diversified firms can add value through
engaging in “winner-picking” in internal capital markets. I estimate the value added by
internal capital markets and find that the global diversification premium is positively
related to the value added from transfers across divisions. This result does not rule
out that agency costs of internal capital markets are prevalent (Shin and Stulz (1998),
Rajan et al. (2000)), but that the premium is larger where the net effect is positive. Fur-
thermore, the results show that the relation between the diversification premium and
transfers across divisions is stronger in well-governed firms. Better governed multina-
tional firms create more value through efficient transfers in their global internal capital
market. In extensions to the main findings, I show that culture, distance, and openness
play a role in explaining the global diversification premium. Additionally, the main
results are robust to country-level differences, and alternative diversification and gover-
nance mechanisms. Further, the results continue to obtain in regressions controlling for
endogeneity and self-selection.
The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that multinational firms’ competitive
advantages lead to higher valuations. Then, if shareholders have global diversification
as an objective, investing in multinational firms is preferable over investing directly in
foreign local firms. This offers insight into why global diversification has continued to
increase, as documented both here and in Denis et al. (2002).
Future research should address better identification of the channels by which multi-
national firms can create value. Specifically, examining organizational structure, the
methods in which multinational firms invest overseas, and the assets they target could
all potentially shed light on the value premium.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of multinational firm investment and operations. Descriptive statistics of
multinational firm investment and operations at the subsidiary level are presented in Panel A for all
years and Panel B year by year. Subsidiaries is the number of subsidiaries, Global Div is the number
of countries, and Ind Div is the number of industries in which a multinational firm invests in a giver
year. Foreign Weight, European Weight, US Weight, and Asia Weight represent the percentage of assets
multinational firms hold in all countries except the UK, Europe, the US, and Asia respectively. Subsidiary
Ownership is the average ownership that a multinational firm holds in its subsidiaries.
Panel A: All years
Mean Median Total Observations
Subsidiaries 18.3 8.0 21,315 1,166
Global Div 12.2 6.0 202 1,166
Ind Div 2.5 2.0 18 1,166
Foreign Weight 54.5% 62.4% - 1,166
European Weight 17.9% 6.2% - 1,166
US Weight 16.5% 1.6% - 1,166
Asia Weight 1.7% 0.0% - 1,166
Subsidiary Ownership 94.5% 100.0% - 1,166
Panel B: Means by year
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 All Years
Firms 156 163 167 179 178 166 157 1,166
Subsidiaries 18.1 17.6 19.4 19.4 19.8 17.8 15.4 18.3
Countries 11.6 11.9 12.1 12.7 13.6 12.4 10.9 12.2
Industries 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.5
Foreign Weight 49.2% 50.5% 49.3% 51.4% 54.6% 59.6% 67.7% 54.5%
European Weight 18.1% 17.2% 15.8% 16.9% 18.8% 18.6% 20.3% 17.9%
US Weight 17.9% 18.4% 19.5% 17.4% 17.9% 11.3% 12.8% 16.5%
Asia Weight 1.5% 0.8% 1.0% 1.0% 1.2% 3.2% 3.3% 1.7%
Subsidiary Ownership 0.949 0.939 0.929 0.947 0.947 0.951 0.950 0.945
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Table 2: Summary statistics of excess Value and diversification. Panel A presents descriptive statistics of
multinational firm excess value and relative firm characteristics. Excess value and relative firm charac-
teristics for multinational firms are calculated as the difference between multinational firm values and a
country-industry matched portfolio of focused foreign firms, using multinational firm asset weights from
the ONS AFDI sample. Specifically, excess value is measured as the log difference in Tobin’s q. Panel
B presents correlation results of global, industrial and organizational (number of subsidiaries) diversifi-
cation for multinational firms. Panel C shows multinational firm excess value conditioning in industrial
and global diversification. *** (**, *) denote significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) confidence level. The
difference in medians is tested using the nonparametric 2-sample test on the equality of medians and
Fisher’s exact test.
Panel A: Excess value and firm characteristics
Mean Median Std Dev Obs
Excess Value 0.101*** 0.060*** 0.514 1,166
Relative Debt/Assets (0.007) (0.019) 0.237 1,166
Relative Capex/Sales 0.037*** (0.003) 0.172 1,166
Relative Ebit/Sales 0.028*** 0.011** 0.097 1,166
Relative R&D/Sales 0.007*** 0.000 0.027 1,166







Panel C: Diversification and excess value
Industries Countries
2 [3,10) >10 ALL
1 -0.088* -0.100* 0.358*** 0.038
2 -0.080** 0.079* 0.305*** 0.103***
>2 0.075** 0.077** 0.196*** 0.133***
ALL -0.046 0.082** 0.245*** 0.101***
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Table 3: Excess Value and global diversification. Each column presents estimates from a regression of
excess value on measures of global diversification and relative firm-level characteristics. Excess value
(relative firm-level characteristics) are calculated as the difference between the Tobin’s q (firm character-
istics) for the multinational firm and imputed Tobin’s q (firm characteristics), where imputed values are
calculated using median country-industry values in an asset-weighted country-industry matched repli-
cating portfolio. Global diversification (Global Div) is measured as the number of countries in which a
multinational firm invests in a given year. All regressions include multinational firm clustered standard
errors and calendar-year dummies. *** (**, *) denote significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) confidence level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global Div 0.008*** 0.019*** 0.007*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Global Div2 -1.77e-4*** -1.71e-4***
(5.08e-5) (4.28e-5)
Relative Debt/Assets 0.120 0.072 0.094
(0.123) (0.117) (0.116)
Relative Capex/Sales 0.519*** 0.500*** 0.490***
(0.196) (0.194) (0.184)
Relative Ebit/Sales 0.972*** 1.024*** 1.058***
(0.284) (0.280) (0.275)
Relative R&D/Sales 4.386*** 3.719*** 3.588***
(1.095) (0.978) (0.963)
Relative Log(Sales) 0.003 -0.017 -0.018
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Constant 0.153*** 0.063 -0.007 0.110** 0.018 -0.052
(0.047) (0.053) (0.056) (0.044) (0.050) (0.054)
Adj. R-Sq 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.17
Obs 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166
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Table 4: Excess value, governance and global diversification. Each column presents estimates from a
regression of excess value on measures of global diversification, relative firm-level characteristics and
corporate governance. Excess value (relative firm-level characteristics) are calculated as in Table 3 and
corporate governance is described in Section 3.2. GOV is the multinational parent composite governance
index collected by Risk Metrics/ISS. GOV GAP represents the gap in composite governance index be-
tween the UK parent and a portfolio of country-industry matched benchmark firms. GOV GAP×OWN
interacts GOV GAP with the percentage ownership that multinational firms have in subsidiaries. GOV
GAP×OWN100 repeats this for only those subsidiaries in which multinational firms own one hundred
percent. POS GOV GAP includes the GOV GAP for multinational firms with GOV GAP>0 and zero
otherwise. All regressions include multinational firm clustered standard errors and year dummies. ***
(**, *) denote significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) confidence level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Global Div 0.0154*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Global Div2 -0.0001 -1.64e-4*** -1.68e-4*** -1.63e-4*** -1.72e-4***
(7.00e-5) (4.28e-5) (4.27e-5) (4.28e-5) (4.24e-5)
GOV 0.009***
(0.002)






Global Div × GOV GAP 0.001***
(0.0003)
POS GOV GAP 0.014***
(0.007)
Relative Debt/Assets 0.082 0.105 0.103 0.108 0.102
(0.124) (0.115) (0.116) (0.115) (0.116)
Relative Capex/Sales 0.138 0.528*** 0.511*** 0.532*** 0.516***
(1.075) (0.176) (0.182) (0.175) (0.178)
Relative Ebit/Sales 1.748*** 1.034*** 1.034*** 1.025*** 1.036***
(0.345) (0.270) (0.274) (0.270) (0.274)
Relative R&D/Sales 2.995*** 3.473*** 3.497*** 3.435*** 3.503***
(0.994) (0.916) (0.937) (0.917) (0.956)
Relative Log(Sales) -0.041* -0.022 -0.021 -0.023 -0.018
(0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Constant -4.065*** -0.037 -0.040 -0.035 -0.060
(1.470) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Adj. R-Sq 0.26 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17
Obs 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166
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Table 5: The efficiency of internal capital markets. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for valued
added (VA). Value added measures the value created through transfers - in terms of investment weights -
towards higher productivity subsidiaries. Panel B presents descriptive statistics from sorts valued added
first by global diversification (Global Div), and second by corporate governance (GOV). Panel C presents
descriptive statistics from two-way sorts on global diversification (Global Div) and corporate governance
(GOV). *** (**, *) denote significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) confidence level.
Panel A: Value added descriptive statistics
Mean Median Std Dev Obs
Value Added (VA) 0.054*** 0.063*** 0.193 1,166
Panel B: Value added two-way splits
Mean Standard Error Std Dev Obs
Global Div (Low) 0.052 0.008 0.198 604
Global Div (High) 0.074 0.008 0.187 562
High-Low 0.022**
GOV (Low) 0.043 0.0105 0.183 478
GOV (High) 0.070 0.009 0.206 688
High-Low 0.027**
Panel C: Value added four-way splits
GOV GOV
Global Div (Low) (High) Difference
(Low) 0.046 0.045 -0.001
(High) 0.038 0.088 0.050***
Difference -0.008 0.043*** 0.051***
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Table 6: Value and the efficiency of internal capital markets. Each column presents estimates from a
regression of value on measures of global diversification, relative firm-level characteristics, value added
and corporate governance. Value is measured as Tobin’s q. Value added (VA) is the asset-weighted value
added from internal capital market transfers across subsidiaries within a multinational firm. GOV is the
multinational parent composite governance index collected by Risk Metrics/ISS. All regressions include
multinational firm clustered standard errors and year dummies. *** (**, *) denote significance at the 1%
(5%, 10%) confidence level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Global Div 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Global Div2 -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
VA 0.284* 0.280* 0.373** 0.207***





Debt/Assets 0.287** 0.141 0.046 0.046
(0.140) (0.140) (0.161) (0.162)
Capex/Sales 1.267*** 1.209*** 1.338*** 1.338***
(0.190) (0.186) (0.249) (0.248)
EBIT/Sales 2.034*** 2.058*** 3.614*** 3.614***
(0.330) (0.324) (0.428) (0.429)
R&D/Sales 10.519*** 8.796*** 7.464*** 7.462***
(1.075) (1.081) (1.110) (1.109)
Log(Sales) -0.018 -0.078*** -0.092*** -0.092***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.030)
Constant 2.186*** 2.783*** -5.030*** -5.030***
(0.323) (0.330) (1.867) (1.867)
R-squared 0.16 0.19 0.24 0.24
Observations 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166
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Table 7: Distance, culture and openness. Each column presents estimates from a regression of excess
value on measures of global diversification, distance, culture and openness. The table shows only the
coefficients of interest. All explanatory variables are estimated at the multinational parent level based on
subsidiary location. Distance measures the asset-weighted distance between the UK and a multinational
firm’s subsidiaries. Language, Religion and Colony are asset-weighted dummy variables indicating if
subsidiary host countries share a common language, common religion and are/were a British colony
respectively. Natural Openness (FR) and Natural Openness (WEI) are asset-weighted measures of the
openness of subsidiary host countries. Control variables shown in Table 3 are included but not presented.
All regressions include multinational firm clustered standard errors and year dummies. *** (**, *) denote
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) confidence level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance Language Religion Colony Natural Natural
Openness Openness
(FR) (WEI)
Global Div 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Global Div2 -1.24e-4*** -1.24e-4*** -1.02e-4*** -1.23e-4*** -1.11e-4*** -1.20e-4***
(5.70e-5) (4.78e-5) (4.64e-5) (4.78e-5) (4.71e-5) (4.73e-5)
Z -0.0136** -0.184*** -0.142** -0.166*** 0.006** 0.187***
(0.0072) (0.049) (0.058) (0.049) (0.002) (0.071)
38
Table 8: Excess value and global diversification: alternate diversification measures. Each column
presents estimates from a regression of excess value on measures of diversification and relative firm-
level characteristics. The table shows only the coefficients of interest. Excess value (relative firm-level
characteristics) are calculated as in Table 3. Global diversification (Global Div) is measured as the the
percentage of total assets that a multinational firm has invested in foreign subsidiaries (Foreign Weight),
and the multinational firm country asset weight Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Country HHI). Industrial
diversification is measured as the number of industries in which a multinational firm invests (Ind Div),
and industry asset weight Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Country HHI). Organizational diversification is
measured as the number of subsidiaries through which a multinational firm invests (Subsidiaries). Con-
trol variables shown in Table 3 are included but not presented. All regressions include multinational




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Global Div 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Global Div2 -1.64e-4*** -1.73e-4*** -1.79e-4***
(4.41e-5) (4.65e-5) (4.56e-5)
Foreign Weight 0.118* -0.003
(0.071) (0.086)
Country HHI -0.295*** -0.030
(0.0996) (0.1420)





Table 9: Excess value and global diversification: endogeneity. Each column presents estimates from
a regression of excess value on measures of global diversification and relative firm-level characteristics.
Regressions (1) and (2) show results from two stage least squares instrumental variable regressions, where
excess value and global diversification are instrumented in first stage regressions. Specifications for the
first stage regression for global diversification are presented in the bottom panel. Regression (3) presents
results from a instrumental variable tobit regression. Regression (4) presents results from a Heckman self-
selection estimation, where global diversification is estimated using a sample of internationally diversified
and focused firms. All regressions include multinational firm clustered standard errors and year dummies.
*** (**, *) denote significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) confidence level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS IVTOBIT Heckman
Self-selection
Global Div 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Relative Debt/Assets 0.063 0.060 0.058 0.075
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.116)
Relative Capex/Sales 0.507*** 0.507*** 0.506*** 0.512***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.195)
Relative Ebit/Sales 1.034*** 1.037*** 1.040*** 1.011***
(0.151) (0.151) (0.150) (0.275)
Relative R&D/Sales 3.591*** 3.551*** 3.515*** 3.750***
(0.566) (0.563) (0.566) (0.983)
Relative Log(Sales) -0.021* -0.022** -0.022* -0.016
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019)
Constant -0.006 -0.001 -0.051 0.011
(0.047) (0.047) (0.042) (0.049)
Adj. R-Sq 0.15 0.14 - -
Obs 1,166 1,166 1,166 2,365
Lambda 0.029
Specification and Instruments
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
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